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ABSTRACT Basel III was initiated after the recent global financial crisis to strengthen the 
regulatory regime for the banking sector. As liquidity problems faced by banks were a key 
feature of the crisis, Basel III has added liquidity requirement ratios in addition to reinforcing the 
capital requirements. Specifically, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) has been introduced to 
ensure liquidity in banks in the short term, and a net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is proposed to 
promote medium- and long-term resilience against liquidity shocks. Islamic banking has been 
growing rapidly in different parts of the world and forms a significant part of the financial sector 
in many countries. This paper examines the implications of the new Basel III liquidity 
requirement ratios for Islamic banks. Given the short history of its development and the 
restrictions imposed by Shari’ah principles, the Islamic banking sector faces several restrictions 
that will constrain its adoption of the Basel III liquidity requirements. After presenting the basic 
principles of Islamic finance, the paper identifies the challenges that Islamic banks will face in 
meeting their liquidity needs and outlines certain practices in which these are being resolved.  
Keywords: Basel III; liquidity coverage ratio; net stable funding ratio; Islamic banking; sukuk; 
Islamic money markets  
INTRODUCTION 
The liquidity problems faced by many financial institutions during the recent global financial 
crisis (GFC), even those with adequate capital levels, highlight the significance of liquidity in the 
proper functioning of the banking sector and financial markets. Responding to the crisis, the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) initiated the Basel III standards to strengthen 
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the regulatory framework, which will enhance the stability of the financial sector. As well as 
improving the capital adequacy standards, Basel III has introduced additional controls related to 
leverage and liquidity. Whereas the former is intended to limit the leveraging in banks, the 
liquidity requirements are expected to promote a regime that will help financial institutions 
withstand liquidity shocks.
 
In a cross-country study, BCBS shows that the impact of higher 
capital and liquidity ratios will produce net benefits by significantly reducing the likelihood of 
crises and the accompanying GDP losses.
1
 Similarly, Yan, Hall and Turner show the positive 
impact of Basel III standards in terms of greater stability and lower GDP losses for the UK 
economy.
2
 The new Basel III standards will also require changes in governance, business models 
and processes in banks.
3
  
Although Islamic banking has been growing rapidly and has become a significant part of the 
financial sector in many countries, it came to attention during the GFC as it appeared to be 
withstanding the downturn much better than its conventional counterpart.
4
  Hasan and Dridi 
show that, during the years immediately after the crisis, Islamic banks were more resilient and 
their credit and asset growth were relatively higher compared to conventional banks.
5
 As a result, 
Islamic banks were assessed more favourably by rating agencies in the post-crisis era.  Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Merrouche studied the status of Islamic and conventional banks for the 
period prior to the crisis (1995-2007) and found that Islamic banks had higher capitalization and 
liquidity reserves relative to conventional banks.
6
 Similar results were found by Parashar and 
Venkatesh, who confirmed that liquidity in Islamic banks was higher during both pre- and post-
crisis years.
7
 Better capitalization and liquidity are among the possible reasons for the better 
performance of Islamic banks during the crisis.  
Higher liquidity in Islamic banks, however, is also indicative of the constraints faced by Islamic 
banks in terms of lack of liquidity management instruments and markets arising from adherence 
to Shari’ah principles. Due to Shari’ah restrictions on interest-bearing transactions, Islamic 
banks cannot hold liquid debt securities such as government bonds and are also unable to tap into 
interest-based money markets to obtain cash in case of need.  Due to these restrictions, devising 
infrastructure and instruments to manage liquidity risks is considered a key challenge to the 
sound development of the Islamic banking sector.
8
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While there is a growing body of literature on the implications of Basel III standards for 
conventional banks, studies on their implications for the Islamic banking sector are scant. In 
response to the crisis, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), an international standard-
setting body for Islamic financial institutions, published guidelines on liquidity risk management 
in March 2012.
9
  The document, however, does not cover issues related to application of the 
liquidity ratios identified in Basel III for Islamic banks. This paper explores the issues and 
challenges of implementing the Basel III liquidity requirements for Islamic banks. To do so, the 
paper firstly introduces the basic Shari’ah principles and products used by Islamic banks on both 
the liabilities and assets sides; it then presents the regulatory environments under which these 
banks operate. After outlining the key features of the Basel III liquidity requirements, the 
problems likely to be encountered by Islamic banks in meeting these requirements are analysed. 
ISLAMIC CONTRACTS, BANKING MODEL AND SECURITIES 
The underlying principle of Islamic law related to economics and commerce is permissibility 
(ibahah), which maintains that everything in economic affairs is permitted except those 
explicitly forbidden by divine guidance.
10
 Prohibitions under Islamic law can be broadly 
classified as riba and gharar. Riba (literally meaning increase or growth) is prohibited by 
Shari’ah (Islamic law). Although it is common to associate riba with interest, it has much wider 
implications and can take different forms. The common premise in the prohibition of riba lies in 
the unequal trade of values in exchange.
11
 One of the implications of riba is that debt cannot be 
sold at a discount and can be transferred at its par value only. 
While gharar literally means ‘danger’ and also signifies deception, the word has connotations of 
excessive uncertainty and contractual ambiguity in transactions.
12
 Gharar can exist in the terms 
of a contract or in the object of a contract. Gharar in a contract arises when the consequences of 
a transaction are not clear and there is uncertainty about whether a transaction will take place. 
Gharar in the object of the contract arises when there is uncertainty about the subject matter of 
the sale and its delivery.  Islamic law distinguishes between ownership and possession and 
requires actual possession before selling something to ensure delivery.
13
 Gharar is present when 
either the object of sale does not exist or the seller and/or buyer has no knowledge of the object 
being exchanged.  
Islamic Banking: Contracts and Model 
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As interest-based loans are prohibited, Islamic banks replace these with permissible contracts to 
structure their products. Traditional Islamic contracts that are used as modes of financing can be 
broadly classified into equity and debt instruments. While equity instruments are derived from 
partnership contracts (mudarabah and musharakah), debt instruments arise from sale 
transactions. These fixed-income contracts include murabahah (cost-plus or mark-up sale), bai-
muajjal (price-deferred sale), istisna/salaam (object-deferred sale or pre-paid sale) and ijarah 
(leasing).
14
 Before the Islamic banking model is outlined, the basic features of these contracts are 
presented below.   
a) Musharakah: Sharikah is a partnership between parties in which financial capital and/or 
labour act as shared inputs and profit is distributed according to the capital share of the 
partners or in some pre-agreed ratio. The loss, however, is distributed among partners 
according to the share of the capital. Although there can be different kinds of partnerships 
based on money, labour and reputation, one particular case of sharikah is participation 
financing or musharakah in which partners share in both the capital and management of 
the business enterprise. Thus, partners in musharakah have both control rights and claims 
to the profit.  
b) Mudarabah:  Mudarabah is similar to the concept of silent partnership in which financial 
capital is provided by one or more partner(s) (rab al mal) and the work is carried out by 
the other partner(s) (mudarib). The funds are used for a particular activity for a fixed 
period of time. The financiers and managers of the project share the profits in an pre-
agreed ratio. The loss, however, is borne by the financiers according to their share in the 
capital. The manager’s loss consists in not receiving any reward for his/her services. As 
the rab al mal is a sleeping partner, he/she has a claim on the profits but has no say in the 
management of the venture. 
c) Murabahah/Bay Muajjal: Murabahah is a sale contract in which the seller adds a profit 
component (mark-up) to the cost of the item being sold. When the purchase is made on 
credit and the payment for a good/asset is delayed, the contract is called bai-muajjal. A 
variant would be a sale where the payments are made in instalments. These contracts 
create debt that can have both short- and long-term tenors. In these debt contracts, the 
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supplier of the good has claims on a fixed amount that must be paid before arriving at 
profits.  
d) Salam: A Salam sale is an advance purchase (or product-deferred) sale of a generic good. 
In a salam contract, the buyer of a product pays in advance for a good that is produced 
and delivered later. The contract applies mainly to agricultural commodities. 
e) Istisna: An  Istisna contract is similar to the salam contract with the difference that in 
istisna the good is produced according to the specifications given by the buyer. This 
applies mainly to manufactured goods and real estate. Furthermore, in istisna the 
payments can be made in instalments over time with the progression of the production. 
Note that, in the case of a firm, istisna can be used in a couple of ways. First, the firm can 
obtain funds to finance its working capital needs. This istisna contract is a debt contract 
that can be used only if the financier is willing to purchase the goods at the stipulated 
time of delivery. The second approach would be for the firm to ask the financier to 
provide a built asset (such as real estate) and to make the payments over a period of time 
in the future. In this case, the financier may need to have a parallel istisna and 
subcontract the project to a third party for its completion. 
f) Ijarah: Ijarah is a lease contract in which the lessee pays rent to the lessor for the use of 
usufruct. In ijarah, the ownership and right to use an asset (usufruct) are separated.  It 
falls under the category of sale-based contract as it involves the sale of usufructs. A lease 
contract that results in the transfer of an asset to the lessee at the end of the contract is 
called ijarah wa iqtina or ijarah muntahia bittamleek. Ijarah wa iqtina combines sale and 
leasing contracts and uses hire-purchase or rent-sharing principles. The ownership of the 
asset is transferred to the lessee, as payments for the asset are also made along with the 
rent. At the end of the contract period, the lessee assumes the ownership of the asset.
15
   
The dominant model of Islamic banking is the one-tier mudarabah with multiple financing tools. 
On the liability side of Islamic banks, demand deposits take the form of qard hasan (interest-free 
loans) that are returned fully on demand. Savings and investment deposits use mudarabah 
contracts and take the form of profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA). Using the profit-
sharing principle to reward depositors is a unique feature of Islamic banks. The returns on PSIA 
are contingent on return on assets, implying that neither the principal nor a return is guaranteed.
16
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On the asset side, Islamic banks use murabahah (cost-plus or mark-up sale), istisna/salam (pre-
paid sale) and ijarah (leasing), and profit-sharing modes of financing (musharakah and 
mudarabah). Although, in theory, all these instruments can be used on the assets side, in practice 
most Islamic banks predominantly use debt-based (murabahah) and leasing (ijarah) contracts. In 
some cases, Islamic banks also use tawarruq, a controversial transaction that replicates an 
interest-based loan. This mode, however, is prohibited by the Islamic Fiqh Academy, a global 
Islamic jurisprudential body, on the grounds that it involves riba.
17
 
Table 1 shows the diversity of banking practices on the asset side in different countries. In all 
countries, except Sudan, the equity-based modes constitute a small percentage of the total 
financing.
18
 The Table shows the dominance of murabahah in all countries, except Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia. Note that, while the category of ‘Others’ constitutes various instruments such as 
real estate, bai-muajjal, etc.,
19
 one of its significant components in some countries is tawarruq.
 
For example, a large percentage of financing in the ‘Others’ category in Saudi Arabia includes 
tawarruq-based products.
20
  
Table 1: Modes of Financing used by Islamic Banks in Selected Countries
21
 
Modes Saudi 
Arabia 
Jordan Malaysia UAE Bahrain Pakistan Sudan 
Murabahah 15.81 15.41 41.04 49.29 51.73 50.96 42.45 
Musharakah 0.65 2.99 0.24 2.59 0.89 2.52 17.77 
Mudarabah 0.05 11.36 0.27 4.36 1.96 - 3.10 
Ijarah 0.04 13.8 9.40 18.90 5.56 20.41 0.87 
Istisna 3.74 1.2 1.72 3.22 0.63 - 0.95 
Salam - - - - - 0.23 0.55 
Others  79.71 55.25 47.33 21.65 39.23 25.88 34.31 
 
Islamic Securities: Sukuk 
The Islamic alternatives to interest-based bonds are sukuk. The Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIF) defines sukuk as “certificates of equal 
value representing, after closing subscription, receipt of the values of certificates and putting it to 
use as planned, common title to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs and services, or 
equity of a given project or equity of a special investment activity”.22 AAOIFI identifies various 
types of sukuks that can be classified based on assets, debt, equity, and services.  Asset-based 
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securities include ijarah sukuks, which are certificates issued against a tangible, leased asset, 
and/or promise of lease in the future.  
Debt-based sukuks arise from transactions that create debt. Murabahah sukuks are used to raise 
funds from investors in order to purchase goods or assets that are sold at a mark-up to the 
originator. The price of the goods is repaid to the sukuk holders at a later date either in 
instalments or as a one-off payment. Holders of istisna sukuks provide funds that are used in the 
construction of real estate, and investors become the owners of the real estate upon completion. 
Equity-based sukuks arise when funds raised are used in profit/output-sharing contracts. The 
holders of mudarabah sukuks participate in a project in which the issuer acts as a manager and 
the returns are shared on a profit/loss basis.
23
 Musharakah sukuk holders invest in and manage 
the project and share the profit according to a pre-agreed ratio. Under the agency-based wakala 
sukuk, the holders of the certificates provide funds that are managed by an investment agency in 
some income-generating activity. The manager or agent is paid a certain fee for the services 
provided.     
Holders of sukuks are the owners of the rights and bear the risks that these instruments represent. 
Depending on the contractual basis used, sukuks can have fixed or variable returns and may be 
tradable. Securities can be traded at negotiable prices if these represent equity, real physical 
assets or usufruct.
24
 However, sukuks representing debt or money are not negotiable and can be 
exchanged at par value only.  
While sukuk is a relatively new phenomenon that began in the early 2000s, it has grown rapidly 
in a short period of time. Although the sukuk issuance decreased significantly after the global 
financial crisis, the sector has rebounded in recent years. IFSB reports that, with an average 
growth rate of 60.1% during the period 2009-2012, the total outstanding sukuk stood at USD 
229.3 billion by the end of 2012.
25
 During 2012, sukuk was predominantly issued by sovereign 
issuers, of which the central bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) dominated the market, 
contributing to 43.7% of all issuances (amounting to USD 57.3 billion). The share of the primary 
market issues in the GCC region, which is the other major market, was 18% of the total issues, 
with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia being among the larger issuers.    
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ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STANDARDS 
The Shari’ah compliant contracts used by Islamic banks change the risk-return features of 
products on both the assets and liabilities sides and have regulatory implications.
26
 While some 
of the regulatory standards of BCBS can be applied to Islamic banks, Shari’ah compliant 
contracts introduce certain unique features that are not dealt with in international regulatory 
standards.
27
 For example, the use of profit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA) on the liability 
side raises several regulatory issues. One key concern related to PSIA is whether to consider 
them as deposits or treat them as capital, as they share the risks of the assets.
28
 Furthermore, as 
the returns on PSIA are based on the profit/loss-sharing principle there is a need to protect the 
rights of depositors/investors. The fiduciary nature of the contract would also require more 
disclosure of banking operations to the depositors/investors.  
Recognising the specific regulatory requirements of Islamic financial institutions, the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established in 2002 as an international standard-setting 
body for the Islamic financial services industry. As of April 2014, the IFSB had  184 members, 
comprising 59 regulatory and supervisory authorities, eight international inter-governmental 
organisations and 117 market players, professional firms and self-regulatory organisations 
operating in 45 jurisdictions. To date, IFSB has issued 22 standards, guiding principles and 
technical notes covering various regulatory aspects for Islamic banking, insurance (takaful) and 
capital markets.
29
 
The IFSB regulatory standards and guidelines for Islamic banks can be categorised into two 
broad types. The first set of standards comprises the Islamic counterparts of the conventional 
international regulatory guidelines and principles and it includes the prudential standards 
required to ensure a stable and sound financial system. IFSB uses the existing international 
standards issued by standard-setting bodies such as BCBS as a basis for its own standards and 
modifies these to cater to Islamic banking practices. For example, the Capital Adequacy 
Standard for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial 
Services (IFSB-2) issued in 2005 is primarily based on the principles outlined in Pillar 1 of the 
Basel II standards. Specifically, the IFSB modified and adapted two documents of the BCBS to 
develop the appropriate capital requirements for Islamic banking practices.
30
  Subsequent to the 
introduction of  Basel III by BCBS in the aftermath of the financial crisis, IFSB responded by 
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issuing the Revised Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services  [Excluding Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Collective Investment 
Schemes] (IFSB-15) incorporating the changes in capital adequacy requirements in the new 
international standards.
31
  The second type of standards of IFSB is unique to the Islamic financial 
industry. An example from this category of standards is the Guiding Principles on Shari’ah 
Governance Systems for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-10), which 
provides guidelines for a sound Shari’ah governance framework in Islamic financial institutions.  
As is the case in other international standard-setting bodies, IFSB does not have enforcement 
powers to ensure the adoption of its prudential standards in different jurisdictions. As such, the 
adoption of various IFSB standards vis-à-vis the Basel standards depends on the regulators. 
Overall, the IFSB standards have been implemented only in a few jurisdictions. While some of 
the IFSB standards, such as IFSB-6 and IFSB-11, had not been applied by any regulator by the 
end of 2011, two of its standards, IFSB-2 and IFSB-3, had been adopted by only six countries.
32
  
Given the above, the regulatory regimes for Islamic banks can be broadly categorised into three 
types. The first constitutes a small group of countries that have specific regulatory guidelines for 
Islamic banks. Countries in this category include Bahrain where the Central Bank of Bahrain 
issued the CBB Rulebook Volume 2 which provides the detailed regulatory guidelines for Islamic 
banks and Oman where Central Bank issued the comprehensive Islamic Banking Regulatory 
Framework in 2012.
33
 In the second group of countries Islamic banks are required to follow the 
regulations that apply to their conventional counterparts, although some adjustments and 
modifications are made for Shari’ah compliant transactions. For example, in the cases of the 
Dubai Financial Services Authority and the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of the country, 
apply the same regulations for both Islamic and conventional financial institutions with some 
changes and modifications to accommodate the operations of the former.
34
 The third group 
constitutes countries in which Islamic banks operate under the same regulatory regime as their 
conventional counterparts. In these countries, which include Saudi Arabia and UK, Islamic banks 
adjust their operations to comply with the existing regulations.  
In countries that do not have specific regulations for Islamic finance, all banks, including Islamic 
ones, have to comply with the Basel-based national regulatory stipulations. In these countries, 
Islamic banks must develop appropriate products and instruments that comply with both Shari’ah 
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and Basel regulatory standards.
35
 This, however, is likely to be challenging for Islamic banks due 
to the constraints imposed by Shari’ah and the scarcity of available products that satisfy the 
Basel requirements. For example, to meet the new Basel III capital adequacy requirements, 
Islamic banks would require acceptable Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital on the one hand and would have 
to ascertain the value of the risk-weighted assets in their portfolios with the new risk-weights on 
the other hand. As PSIA cannot be accepted as capital under the stringent definitions of Basel III, 
one option may be to come up with long-term equity-based sukuk that fulfils the definition of 
capital under the new regulatory requirements.
36
 Similarly, as Basel III pays more attention to 
market risks and counterparty risks, the risk weights for partnership contracts such as mudarabah 
and musharakah and sale-based instruments such as salam and istisna are likely to increase.
37
  
 
LIQUIDITY RISKS AND BASEL III LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS 
Liquidity is the ‘ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come 
due, without incurring unacceptable losses’.38 The sources of liquidity beyond normal banking 
practices can be distinguished into three types: ‘funding’ liquidity can be sought by obtaining 
credit from other financial institutions; ‘market’ liquidity can be obtained by selling assets in 
financial markets; and ‘central bank liquidity’ in the form of credit can be obtained from the 
Central Bank by providing acceptable collateral.  Liquidity risk may result from difficulties in 
obtaining cash at reasonable cost either from borrowings (funding liquidity risk) or from sale of 
assets (market liquidity risk).
39
 To meet liquidity needs from private sources, a bank must hold 
assets that can be sold or used as collateral to obtain credit from other financial intermediaries.
40
 
However, market failures may constrain access to liquidity from private sources. Opaque bank 
assets create information-related problems whereby financial institutions may be unable to 
screen and monitor the prospective borrowers adequately.
41
 The failure of markets to provide 
liquidity can be resolved in two ways. First, private arrangements can be used between banks to 
create liquidity pools that can be used in case of need. However, this is difficult to implement, 
particularly when the financial sector experiences economy-wide negative shocks. In such cases, 
public bodies such as the central bank must provide the liquidity to prevent serious interruptions 
to operations, which can lead to bank failures.  One of the tools used by central banks is the 
provision of emergency funding to banks as the lender of last resort (LOLR).  
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While BCBS had published guidelines related to liquidity risk management prior to the GFC, the 
central role of liquidity in exacerbating the crisis led to the inclusion of specific liquidity 
requirements in Basel III.
42 
 The objective of introducing the regulatory liquidity requirements 
along with the capital requirements is to promote a more resilient banking sector by improving 
its ability to withstand shocks from different sources.
43
  Specifically, Basel III introduced the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to cater for the short-term liquidity needs and risks and the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) to ensure adequate liquid funds in the medium/long term.  The 
essential features of these ratios are discussed next.
44
  
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 
The regulatory requirement for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which banks would be 
required to report at least monthly, is defined as: 
LCR=HQLA/TNCO ≥ 100% 
where HQLA is the stock of high-quality liquid assets and TNCO is the total net cash outflows 
defined as the liquidity outflows less the inflows over a 30-day stress period. Liquidity outflows 
include, among others, specific percentages of deposits (5% of retail deposits that are covered 
by deposit insurance schemes, 10% for those not covered) and various liabilities that become 
due during the next 30 days.  Similarly, liquidity inflows include contractual inflows that the 
bank is certain to receive over the next 30 days. Note that the inflows are limited to 75% of the 
liquidity outflows.   
BCBS considers HQLA as those that ‘can be easily and immediately converted into cash at little 
or no loss of value’.45 The fundamental characteristics of HQLA include low risk, ease and 
certainty of valuation, low correlation with other risk assets, and being listed on a developed and 
recognized exchange market.
46
 The market-related characteristics of HQLA include assets traded 
in active and sizable markets, low volatility, and features of flight-to-quality assets whereby their 
demand increases in systemic crises.   
HQLA is segregated into Level 1 and Level 2 assets.
47
  Level 1 assets have very high credit and 
liquidity qualities and are not subject to any haircuts. These include cash (coins and banknotes), 
central bank reserves, and marketable securities representing claims in or guaranteed by 
sovereigns and national and international public bodies (such as central bank, public sector 
12 
 
entities, multilateral development banks, etc.) that satisfy the certain conditions, which include 
carrying a 0% credit risk weight under the Basel II Standardized Approach.
48
 
Level 2 assets constitute high-quality credit and liquid assets which are further classified into 
types Level 2A and Level 2B. A haircut of 15% is applied to Level 2A assets, which include the 
following
49
:     
 Marketable securities issued by sovereigns, central banks, public sector entities and 
multilateral development banks carrying a 20% credit risk weight under the Basel II 
Standardized Approach. 
 Corporate debt securities, commercial papers and covered bonds that satisfy the 
following: they should have a long-term credit rating of at least AA-; however, in the 
absence of a long-term rating, they should have a short-term rating that is qualitatively 
equivalent to a long-term rating; in the absence of a rating, they should be internally rated 
as having a probability of default equivalent to a credit rating of at least AA-.  
Level 2B assets can be included as HQLA at the discretion of the regulators. Different haircuts 
are applied to different types of Level 2B assets. Some examples of haircuts applied are as 
follows: 
 Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) can be included provided a haircut of 
25% is applied and the following conditions are met: they are not issued by the bank 
itself or its affiliates; they have a long-term credit rating of AA or higher; in the absence 
of a long-term rating, they should have a short-term rating that is qualitatively equivalent 
to a long-term rating.  
 Corporate debt securities including commercial papers are included provided a haircut of 
50% is applied and the following conditions are met: not issued by the bank itself or its 
affiliates; having a long-term credit rating between A+ and BBB-; in the absence of a 
long-term rating, having a short-term rating that is qualitatively equivalent to a long-term 
rating.  
 Common equity shares can be included in Level 2B assets provided a haircut of 50% is 
applied and the following condition is met: not issued by the bank itself or its affiliates. 
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Basel III stipulates a cap at 40% of the Level 2 assets and 15% of Level 2B assets of the total 
HQLA.
50
 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
Whereas the objective of LCR is to ensure that banks have enough liquidity in the short term 
(three months), the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is intended to promote medium- and long-
term resilience against shocks. NSFR focuses on ensuring that banks have on-going stable 
funding sources on the liability side to fund long-term assets over a year. NSFR, which should be 
reported to the supervisors at least quarterly, is defined as follows: 
NSFR = ASF/RSF > 100% 
where ASF is the available amount of stable funding relating to the sources of funds and RSF is 
the required amount of stable funding linked to the uses of funds.
51
 Stable funding sources 
comprise capital, preference shares and liabilities with maturities of more than one year, 
deposits, and wholesale funding with maturities of less than a year but expected to remain with 
the bank over long stress periods. To arrive at the ASF, the items in the stable funding are 
multiplied by ASF factors ranging from 0% to 100% depending on their maturity and other 
characteristics. For example, capital, preferred stocks, and liabilities with maturity of more than 
one year have a 100% ASF factor, while unsecured wholesale funding and non-maturity demand 
and term deposits of less than one year carry an ASF factor weight of 50%.
52
  
While the ASF relates to the capital/liability side of the balance sheet, the RSF is linked to the 
liquidity characteristics of the assets and off-balance sheet items and activities (BCBS 2010a).
53
 
Similar to ASF, RSF is calculated by multiplying different assets and off-balance liabilities by 
appropriate RSF factors ranging from 0% to 100%. A higher RSF factor indicates that an asset 
cannot be monetized easily either through sale or by using it as collateral to obtain external 
funding, and it would therefore require a more stable funding source. For example, cash, 
unencumbered short-term unsecured instruments, transactions, securities, and loans with less 
than one year of maturities carry a weight of 0%, while unencumbered gold, equity securities and 
corporate or covered bonds that fulfil certain requirements (including rating A+ to A-) have an 
RSF factor of 50%.  
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To meet the liquidity ratios, banks can switch to higher-quality assets, shorten the maturity of 
assets, increase the length of their liabilities and raise more capital.
54
 Recognizing that some 
jurisdictions may have insufficient Level 1 and Level 2 assets to meet the LCR requirements, 
BCBS provides the following three options as alternatives.
55
 
Option 1- Contractual committed liquidity facilities from the relevant central bank with a fee: 
The arrangement to meet liquidity needs to satisfy the LCR are independent of the regular 
standing arrangements that banks have with the central bank. An irrevocable contract with a 
maturity date that falls outside the 30-day LCR window guides the facility. Under this scheme, a 
bank will be guaranteed to obtain the liquidity by paying a fee to the central bank. The fee is 
payable irrespective of whether the bank avails itself of the facility from the central bank during 
the contract period.  
Option 2 - Foreign currency HQLA to cover domestic currency liquidity needs: In countries that 
do not have sufficient HQLA in domestic currencies, supervisors can permit banks to hold 
HQLA in other currencies under certain conditions, including managing the associated foreign 
currency risks. Appropriate haircuts would be imposed on assets of different currencies, the 
minimum being 8% for major currencies exchanged in global foreign exchange markets. 
Option 3 - Additional use of Level 2 assets with a higher haircut: In countries that lack sufficient 
Level 1 assets but have adequate Level 2A assets, supervisors can allow the holding of additional 
assets of the latter type subject to a minimum haircut of 20%. 
BCBS (2013: 19-20) asserts that, while the LCR requirement should hold for both conventional 
and Islamic banks, the latter face constraints related to instruments and products in fulfilling it.
56
 
BCBS indicates that HQLA for Islamic banks would include Shari’ah-compliant instruments 
such as sukuk (Islamic securities) subject to applying appropriate haircuts. Before discussing the 
complexities arising from applying the Basel III liquidity requirements in Islamic banks, the 
basic features of Islamic financial contracts and banking model are outlined next.  
 
BASEL III LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ISLAMIC 
BANKS 
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Liquidity risk arises when banks face problems in obtaining cash at reasonable cost from 
borrowings or sale of assets. In conventional banks, the funding liquidity needs of banks can be 
met either from private sources, such as other financial institutions, or from inter-bank money 
markets. Islamic banks, however, face constraints on accessing liquidity from these sources due 
to their adherence to Shari’ah. As interest-based loans are prohibited by Shari‘ah, Islamic banks 
cannot borrow funds to meet liquidity requirements in case of need. Furthermore, sales of debt 
are proscribed by Islamic law in most jurisdictions, and Islamic banks would not be able to sell 
their debt-based assets to secure market liquidity. As such, there are no organised Islamic money 
markets in most countries from which funds can be sought in times of need.   Malaysia is one of 
the few countries with an Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) in which mudarabah-based 
interbank investments can be used.
57
 Similarly, Islamic banks in Indonesia can either use the 
Domestic Interbank Shari’ah Financial Market, which operates using a mudarabah-based 
Interbank Investment certificate, or place their excess liquidity with the central bank under the 
Wadiah Certificate scheme. The market liquidity can be sought by selling liquid assets in the 
securities markets. As most assets of Islamic banks are predominantly debt-based, these are 
illiquid due to Shari’ah restrictions on sale of debt.  Thus, raising funds by selling debt-based 
assets is not an option available to Islamic financial institutions.  
Abdullah provides an overview of some of the liquidity management instruments used in 
different countries.
58
 In the UAE, the central bank launched debt-based commodity murabahah 
(tawarruq) Islamic certificates of deposits with maturities of one week to a year.  To facilitate 
the liquidity management of Islamic banks, the Central Bank of Bahrain started issuing short-
term salam-based sukuk.  As salam sukuk are debt-based and not tradable, the central bank has 
now started issuing ijarah-based ones which, being asset-based, are tradable. However, the lack 
of active secondary markets for sukuk can hinder their sale at appropriate prices.   
While private sources of liquidity are restricted for Islamic banks due to lack of Shari’ah-
compliant instruments and markets, the role of public bodies in facilitating provision of liquidity 
is also limited. As indicated, one of the available safety nets is the option to obtain emergency 
funds from the central bank in the form of lender of last resort (LOLR).  Islamic banks, however, 
can face problems in availing themselves of this facility as most of the existing LOLR facilities 
are interest-based. An IFSB survey of the central banks of its 24 member countries carried out in 
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2012 shows that only six had Shari’ah-compliant LOLR facilities.59 The study also revealed that, 
of the countries surveyed, only two had discount windows facilities that met Shari’ah 
requirements and only five countries had Shari’ah-compliant deposit services for Islamic banks. 
Indonesia is one of the few countries in which Islamic banks can obtain short-term funds from 
the central bank via the LOLR scheme.  Based on mudarabah, the scheme provides financing 
from 14 to 90 days against collateral such as sovereign bonds and sukuk.
60
  The return paid on 
the funds is tied to the deposit rate that the bank pays to other clients.   
Islamic Banks and Basel III Liquidity Ratios 
The dearth of available instruments due to Shari’ah principles in most jurisdictions will restrict 
Islamic banks to holding liquid assets identified in the LCR.
61
 As indicated above, Level 1 assets 
included in HQLA include cash, reserves with central banks, and marketable securities issued by 
sovereigns and other national and international bodies. In most countries, these securities will be 
interest-based and avoided by Islamic banks. While, in a few countries, governments and central 
banks issue sukuk, most of these are not tradable due either to Shari’ah restrictions or to inactive 
secondary markets. Because of the scarcity of liquid Shari’ah-compliant securities and non-
existent active secondary markets, there are insufficient Level 2 assets that satisfy the LCR 
requirements.  This is confirmed in a survey of 64 Islamic financial institutions carried out by 
IFSB in 2011 which concludes that, in the majority of the jurisdictions, Shari’ah-compliant 
securities are not available in sufficient quantity and quality to meet the requirements of Level 1 
and Level 2 assets defined by Basel III.
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Similarly, Islamic banks will also face problems in meeting the Basel III NSFR requirement. For 
example, Islamic banks cannot hold preference shares, a source of liquidity with 100% ASF 
factor, as these are considered to be non-Shari’ah-compliant. The bulk of the assets in NSFR that 
have low RSF factors are marketable securities and bonds, particularly those issued by 
sovereigns and public bodies. However, due to the lack of Shari’ah-compliant securities that 
fulfil these criteria in most jurisdictions, Islamic banks will not be able to hold assets carrying 
relatively higher RSF factors.  
As mentioned above, Basel III provides three options for countries that do not have sufficient 
Level 1 and Level 2 assets to meet the LCR requirement. Under option 1, the central bank can 
provide liquidity facilities for a fee. This appears to be a feasible alternative that can be used to 
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support Islamic banks in meeting their liquidity requirements. However, as most of the 
jurisdictions still do not have Islamic LOLR facilities, providing Shari’ah-compliant liquidity 
facilities will be challenging.  Using Options 2 and 3 identified in Basel III is not viable for the 
Islamic banking sector due to the overall scarcity of marketable Shari’ah-compliant securities at 
both the national and international levels and the lack of exchanges where these can be traded. 
One problem in the implementation of Option 2, which suggests using high-quality foreign 
currency sukuk as substitutes for domestic ones, is the different Shari’ah interpretations in 
various jurisdictions, rendering instruments issued in one country unacceptable in another. For 
example, Malaysia is one of the dominant players in the issuing of sukuk. However, some of 
their securities may be unacceptable in the GCC region due to different Shari’ah interpretations.  
A few international initiatives have been taken to resolve problems related to the development 
and acceptability of Islamic securities. The International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) was 
established in 2002 in Bahrain as a global standard-setting body for the Islamic capital and 
money markets.
63
 The organization focuses on the standardization of documentation and 
processes of Islamic capital market-related financial products. In the same year, the Liquidity 
Management Centre (LMC) was established to develop short- and medium-term financial 
instruments that can be used by Islamic financial institutions for liquidity management 
purposes.
64
 However, the scope of operations of LMC has been relatively small, focusing more 
on the GCC region in general and Bahrain in particular. More recently, the International Islamic 
Liquidity Management Corporation was established in 2010 in Kuala Lumpur to issue sukuk that 
can be traded in international financial markets and used by Islamic financial institutions for 
liquidity management purposes globally.
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Without an adequate supply of liquid Shari’ah-compliant instruments and active markets in 
which to trade them, it will be difficult for Islamic banks to meet the Basel III liquidity 
requirements. The implication of having fewer assets that can be treated as liquid for both LCR 
and NSFR is that Islamic banks will have to hold more cash and reserves. In the absence of high-
quality assets, banks may have to shorten the maturity of assets, increase the length of their 
liabilities and raise more capital to meet the liquidity requirements.
66
 This may put Islamic banks 
in a disadvantageous position compared to their conventional counterparts and create obstacles to 
the long-term growth of the industry. To resolve their liquidity needs, Islamic banks may require 
additional innovative measures and initiatives. 
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A novel arrangement for managing liquidity at the private level has been initiated by the Central 
Bank of Sudan which encourages banks to create ‘alliance groups’ to fulfil certain objectives 
including managing liquidity.
67
 This plan takes the form of creating liquidity pools that can be 
used in case of need among the participating banks. However, in the event of economy-wide 
shocks, the scheme may not be able to meet the needs of all the participating banks and will 
require a response at the level of governmental bodies. Given the lack of active sukuk markets, 
one option is for a central bank to act as ‘market maker of last resort’ (MMLR).68 In its role as 
MMLR, the central bank would buy the illiquid sukuk at discounted prices, thereby providing 
liquidity to banks when needed.   
CONCLUSION  
Although the Islamic financial industry is one of the fastest-growing sectors in many countries, it 
lacks liquidity instruments and infrastructure, which may hamper its future growth. In many 
jurisdictions in which Islamic banks operate, there are no inter-Islamic banks or organized 
money markets from which funds might be sought in times of need.  Furthermore, due to the lack 
of liquid sukuk and active sukuk markets, Islamic banks face significant market liquidity risks. 
While, in some countries, central banks are playing an important role in providing tradable 
instruments to meet the short-term liquidity needs of Islamic banks, the scarcity of Shari’ah-
compliant liquid assets is still a serious problem, forcing many Islamic banks to hold more cash.  
Moving forward, liquidity management is one of the most challenging tasks facing Islamic 
financial institutions. Islamic banks will face constraints in attempting to fulfil the Basel III 
liquidity requirements if the liquidity instruments and infrastructure are not developed.  A robust 
liquidity infrastructure for the Islamic financial sector will be required, not only for the smooth 
functioning of Islamic banks but also to fulfil the regulatory liquidity requirements of Basel III. 
A sound liquidity infrastructure for the Islamic financial sector would include the development 
of private sources of liquidity (such as an Islamic money market and a vibrant securities market) 
and supportive public safety-net facilities such as LLOR facilities. Given the restrictions arising 
from Shari’ah principles, there may also be a need for innovative initiatives to resolve the 
liquidity management requirements at both the private and public levels. 
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